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My initial research question sought to understand the influence of out-of-
state contributions on state judicial elections so as to determine if judicial 
elections were fulfilling their majoritarian intent. The idea behind infusing 
majoritarianism with judicial elections is to ensure that the judiciary is reflective 
of the people it governs. The question then becomes, if judicial campaign 
contributions come from out-of-state, do these extra-constituent contributions 
influence the judiciary and skew adjudications in a manner that is discordant 
with the ideology and inclinations of the judiciary’s electorate. Unfortunately, this 
line of inquiry quickly ended as I was unable to ascertain all of the donors in a 
sampling of state judicial elections due to the presence of dark money, which is 
rapidly growing in state judicial elections.  
Using existing research, I examine if judges consider electoral 
considerations during adjudication, if securing campaign contributions are an 
important electoral consideration, and if so, are judges likely to consider 
campaign donors when adjudicating a case. While inconclusive, there is strong 
evidence to indicate that judges do consider sources of campaign funds during 
adjudication.  
Ultimately, I conclude that additional campaign finance reform is needed 
to eliminate the presence of untraceable contributions in state judicial elections. 
Current Supreme Court precedent provides a strong basis for the legality of 
stronger campaign finance regulations on judicial elections even though similar 
laws would unlikely be upheld for legislative or executive elections.  
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 Both advocates and opponents of judicial elections have a vested interest 
in knowing what influence money is having on the judiciary. By enacting 
additional campaign finance reforms on state judicial elections, states can verify 
that the judiciary’s performance reflects the majoritarian intent behind judicial 
elections. Ultimately, without new campaign finance regulations mandating 
additional disclosure of contributions, the full impact of money in state judicial 
elections will remain unknown. This absence of data prevents a complete 
understanding of whether state judicial elections are having a positive or 
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Ch. 1 The Conundrum Of Purpose 
 “Under some [state] constitutions the judges are elected and 
subject to frequent reelection. I venture to predict that sooner or 
later these innovations will have dire results and that one day it 
will be seen that by diminishing the magistrates’ independence, 
not judicial power only but the democratic public itself has been 
attacked.” – Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy In America, 1835 
Introduction 
At the inception of this paper, I sought to determine the influence of out-
of-state money on state judicial elections. 1 The driving premise behind this 
inquiry was to determine if judicial elections were fulfilling their majoritarian 
intent. The idea behind infusing majoritarianism with judicial elections is to 
ensure that the judiciary is reflective of the people it impacts. The question for me 
then became, if judicial campaign contributions come from out-of-state, do these 
extra-constituent contributions influence the judiciary and skew adjudications in 
a manner that is discordant with the ideology and inclinations of the judiciary’s 
electorate?  
I was unsuccessful in my endeavor to resolve this question. Independent 
expenditure groups, or super PACs, and 501(c)4 groups are playing an 
increasingly large role in financing judicial elections. These groups can accept 
contributions from corporations, unions, associations and individuals. These 
                                                     
1 Please note, most studies of state judiciaries only examine a state’s supreme court and/or 
appellate courts. Consequently, the whole state would be its constituency. Thus an out-of-state 
contribution would be an extra-constituent contribution. However, state judiciaries are also 
often made up of district courts that encompass smaller portions of a state. These judges are 
also elected in some states. As such, an intrastate contribution could still be an extra-constituent 
contribution. However, due to the prominence of academic literature that focuses on a state’s 
higher courts, both out-of-state contributions and extra-constituent contributions will be used 
interchangeable throughout this paper.  
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contributing groups, or the “donor’s donors,” are often not required to disclose 
their sources of income or contributions. Consequently, on the independent 
expenditure group’s financial disclosure forms, the disclosures simply state the 
name of the contributing organization and not the true original source of the 
money. The original source(s), whether an individual or special interest group, is 
never actually revealed and so it is not known whether that money even derives 
from within a judiciary’s constituency or not.  
As a result of these factors, my initial attempts at researching the original 
sources of contributions used by groups financing judicial elections were quickly 
stymied. Accordingly, this prevented any methodical and empirical study of the 
influence of out-of-state contributions to judicial elections and what impact it 
may have on the performance of an elected judge. It is this inability to determine, 
measure, and study the source of judicial campaign contributions, let alone their 
influence, that guides this theoretically based examination of state judicial 
elections.  
Ultimately, I conclude that additional campaign finance reform is needed 
to eliminate the presence of untraceable contributions in state judicial elections. 
Both advocates and opponents of judicial elections have a vested interest in 
knowing what influence money is having on the judiciary. However, vast sums of 
untraceable money are being poured into judicial elections and it is obscuring any 
attempts to accurately measure what influence the source of money has on the 
behavior of the court. By enacting additional campaign finance reforms on state 
judicial elections, states can verify the judiciary’s performance reflects the 
majoritarian intent behind judicial elections. The ultimate intent of this paper is 
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that without additional campaign finance regulation mandating additional 
disclosure of contributions, the full impact of money in state judicial elections is 
unknown, let alone whether extra-constituent contributions have a positive or 
negative impact.  
This paper does not seek to resolve the broader issue of whether judicial 
elections are an overall positive or negative practice, which is a topic that has 
been studied and written about at length for decades without resolution, but 
rather seeks to address a derivative issue, or rather a byproduct of the practice of 
judicial elections, one which has an immediate and ongoing impact on the 
integrity of the judiciary; and a legislative resolution of which is much more likely 
to be forthcoming than a sweeping overhaul of state judicial elections. In doing 
so, the paper will identify a policy proposal that if implemented would increase 
transparency and accountability in judicial elections as currently practiced as well 
as inform the broader conversation about the merits of judicial elections. The 
disclosure sought by the policy proposal would be two fold, disclosing the sources 
of judicial campaign contributions and disclosing additional information about 
the degree to which judicial elections are fulfilling their majoritarian intent.2  
This paper is split into three chapters. The first chapter of the paper 
explores the underlying issues and themes behind majoritarianism and the 
judiciary and why they present an inherent conflict of purpose. Understanding 
the unstable platform on which judicial elections occur helps to contextualize the 
issues discussed in the in the second chapter of the paper. Additionally, the issues 
                                                     
2 The extent to which judges should fulfill majoritarian intent is an issue that will be explored at 
length further on in this paper.  
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explored in the second chapter of the paper can also feedback and further the 
understanding of the broader issues discussed in the first chapter. 
The second chapter moves beyond the theoretical discussion of judicial 
elections and examines how state judicial campaigns and elections are conducted, 
the impact judicial elections have on judicial behavior, and why the judiciary is 
especially susceptible to the negative consequences of the increase of money in 
judicial elections. Specifically, the second portion of the paper will examine how 
the rise of spending in elections combined with out-of-state contributions has the 
potential to nullify the majoritarian benefit judicial elections, and by extension, 
the primary justification for judicial elections. Thereby leaving in place a 
controversial practice with inherent vulnerabilities, but now one that is absent of 
its intended positive benefits.  
The third chapter of the paper will propose appropriate campaign finance 
reform to ameliorate the issues addressed in the second chapter while also 
furthering the discourse of the issues addressed in the first chapter. As the initial 
inquiry to study the influence of extra-constituent contributions to state judicial 
elections on judicial behavior was stymied by the inability to compile a 
comprehensive list of original donors, the apparent reform would be for the 
creation of additional disclosure requirements in relation to state judicial 
elections. However, as discussed later on, any such legislation would run contrary 
to the general trend of courts striking down campaign finance regulations. As 
such, before a policy proposal can be explored in-depth, a basis must be made as 
to why judicial elections are fundamentally different from legislative and 
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executive elections and as a result recent court rulings should not be applicable to 
judicial elections. 
To note, while the original question was limited to examining out-of-state 
donors, the result of the proposed disclosure regulations is also applicable to the 
broader issue of whether contributions to judicial elections influence judicial 
adjudication in a manner that is favorable to the contributor, independent of the 
constituent status of the donor. Unlike extra-constituent contributions, there is 
already existing literature, although inconclusive, that examines the impact of 
campaign contributions on judicial behavior, but this line of inquiry is also 
limited to only the donors that have been publically disclosed. As those inclined 
to leverage their contributions to gain preferential treatment by the court, or 
otherwise engage in some other type of controversial behavior, would have a 
vested interest in making the contribution in a manner that prevents disclosure 
of the source the absence of these donors is glaring and presents a major flaw 
with existing data. Additionally, whether the contribution originates in-state or 
out-of-state, if it can be demonstrated that judicial contributions influence 
judicial behavior in favor of the donor, an incentive is created for the court to 
adjudicate in a manner that does not align with the majoritarian intent of judicial 
elections. This then creates another avenue whereby the main justification for 
judicial elections is nullified. While the desire of the non-constituent contributor 
may not always be incongruent with the will of the people, it should not be within 
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the capability of a contributor to dictate whether majority will is reflected by the 
judiciary.3  
Background: The Inherent Tension In State Judicial Elections 
In modern political discourse, there has been a constant drumbeat of 
criticism towards judicial supremacy and “activist judges.” The basis for the 
criticism of judicial supremacy stems from judicial review and the corresponding 
ability of an unelected judge to override legislation passed by elected 
representatives. This conflict between judicial review and majoritarian will has 
been coined the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”4 As a result of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, amongst some political groups there exists a large concern 
about the judiciary and its potential to impede the will of the people. While this 
concern is not without legitimacy, this broad narrative of judiciary supremacy 
does not reflect the fact that a majority of legal cases in America are decided by 
judges who are subject to election.5  
Each state is charged with establishing its own judicial institutions, 
including the method of judicial selection.6 In the United States currently, there 
exists a myriad of methods that states have established for judicial selection.7 
There is an electoral component to judicial selection in 39 states – 78% of all U.S. 
                                                     
3 This premise assumes that a judge considers electoral factors during adjudication and that 
contributions are one such factor, which will be explored later in the paper.  
4 Alexander M. Bickel, “The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court as the Bar of Politics 
16,” (1962); for examining the history of the issue and coining the term counter-majoritarian see, 
Barry Friedman, “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road To 
Judicial Supremacy,” (1998) 
5 Steven Croley, “The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries And The Rule Of Law,” The 
University Of Chicago Law Review vol. 62, no. 2, 1995, 690 
6 Christine Branstad, David Phillips, and Nathan Olson, “A Coin On The Tracks: Can Big Money 
and Judicial Politics Derail Judicial Impartiality Through Election Spending,” Duke Law Review 
60, no. 3 (2012): 717  
7 Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth McGregor, “Judicial Selection Principles: A Perspective,” 75, no. 
4 (2011/12) 1742 
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states – meaning that a significant portion of the American people are affected by 
judicial elections.8 Given that 78% of all U.S. states have an electoral component 
to their method of judicial selection and that 95% of judicial business is 
performed within state courts, state judicial elections have a prominent impact 
on state judiciaries, and by extension, the overall performance of the judiciary. 9  
The main methods of judicial selections are: 
 Merit selection: The process by which judicial applicants are evaluated by a 
nominating commission, which then sends the names of the best qualified 
candidates to the governor. The governor appoints one of the nominees 
submitted by the commission.  
 Nonpartisan election: An election in which a judicial candidate’s party 
affiliation, if any, is not designated on the ballot. Multiple candidates may 
seek the same judicial position. Voters cast ballots for judicial candidates as 
they do for other public officials. 
 Partisan election: An election in which candidates run for a judicial 
position with the official endorsement of a political party. The candidate’s 
party affiliation is listed on the ballot. Multiple candidates may seek the same 
judicial position. Voters cast ballots for judicial candidates as they do for other 
public officials. 
 Gubernatorial appointment: The process by which a judge is appointed 
by the governor (without a judicial nominating commission). The 
appointment may require confirmation by the legislature or an executive 
council.  
 Legislative appointment/election: The process by which judges are 
nominated and appointed or elected by legislative vote only.  
 Note: In most commission-based appointment systems, (gubernatorial, 
legislative, and merit selection) judges run unopposed in periodic retention 
elections, where voters are asked whether the judge should remain on the 
bench.10 
                                                     
8 Matthew Streb, “Judicial Elections and The Public Perception of the Courts,” in The Politics of 
Judicial Independence, edited by Bruce Peabody (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2011) 149 
9 Branstad, Phillips, and Olson, “A Coin On the Tracks,” 752 citing Randall T. Shepard, Electing 
Judges and the Impact on Judicial Independence 
10 Identification of the main types of judicial selection and the associated definitions (quoted 




There is no other constitutional democracy in the world where elected 
judges have such a prominent and widespread role.11 Yet before this singularity of 
the American system can be judged as beneficial or detrimental to the judiciary, 
the basis and intent of judicial elections must be examined. Only once the 
intentions and justifications behind judicial elections are understood can it be 
determined if judicial elections as practiced today are fulfilling their underlying 
basis and intent.  
Majoritarianism 
The origins of judicial elections are rooted in majoritarianism and the 
democratic nature of the American government. The nexus between democracy 
and the American government is explored amply in academic literature and it will 
not be relitigated herein. The basis of this paper presupposes that the American 
government is intricately linked to democratic principles. While there is a 
legitimate basis to debate the extent of democracy’s success in America, it is more 
readily accepted that classical liberal principles are incorporated into the 
institutions of the American system of government. For a precursory, and 
admittedly more symbolic than substantial, examination into the concept that it 
was intended for the people and their beliefs to play a role in the United States’ 
government, one need only look at the first words of the first sentence of the U.S. 
Constitution – “We the people.” 12 It is from this constitution, and so this “we the 
                                                                                                                                                              
The States,” Institute For The Advancement Of The American Legal System at the University Of 
Denver, (2008) p. 6 - 7 
11 Croley, “The Majoritarian Difficulty,” 691 
12 U.S. Const., preamble, see “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence [sic], 
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people,” that the United States government continues to receive it authority and 
legitimacy. 
Operating under this presupposition that democracy is a valued and 
underlying principle in the United States government, the value of 
majoritarianism in American can then be explored by establishing the nexus 
between democracy and majoritarianism. In Steven Croley’s The Majoritarian 
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, Croley, at some length, 
explores the link between democracy and majoritarianism in his efforts to study 
the potential dangers of judicial elections. In that this paper seeks to explore the 
same link, Croley’s argument linking democracy and majoritarianism is surmised 
briefly below so that more attention can be dedicated to building off of his 
conclusions, instead of redundant efforts to demonstrate what Croley has already 
sufficiently demonstrated.  
Democracy, reduced to its most central principle, is rule by the people, in 
that it “affords all qualified members of the political community [an equal] voice 
in political decision making.”13 With this understanding, majoritarianism 
becomes a complicit product of democracy since “once citizens of the polity are 
political equals – that is, once they have an equal voice in decision-making 
processes – it follows that policy alternatives attracting the most voices will 
prevail.”14 Or rather less eloquently phrased, majoritarianism is the idea that, if 
all citizens have an equal voice in government, the position with the most 
                                                                                                                                                              
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” 
13 Croley, “The Majoritarian Difficulty,” 702; though as Croley discloses, he does “not pretend to 
capture all of what entails with a single principle.”   
14 Croley, “The Majoritarian Difficulty,” 702 
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supporters will prevail.  Provided this understanding, Croley defines the 
majoritarian principle of democracy as: 
“The Majoritarian Principle of Democracy: All qualified members of 
the political community have an equal voice in political decisions 
made by the community, such that political decisions generating 
the support of a majority of the community’s members for that 
reason carry the day.”15 
 
Therefore in practice, the majoritarian principle of democracy affords the largest 
bloc of the citizenry in agreement on a particular issue the right to determine the 
outcome for all of the citizenry on the issue at hand. This concept has been 
described in a more pejorative manner as a “tyranny of the majority.”16  
 This byproduct of an absolute democracy was not without observation by 
the American framers. Much rather, it was identified as a problem to be guarded 
against, as discussed most prominently in The Federalist 10. James Madison, 
calling the dominant voting block a “faction,” recognized the ability of individuals 
to unite out of common interest 0r passion in a manner that is “[adverse] to the 
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community.”17 Madison continues, “a pure democracy … can admit of no cure for 
the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, 
be felt by a majority of the whole; a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there 
                                                     
15Croley, “The Majoritarian Difficulty,” 703 
16 Alexis De Tocqueville, “Democracy In America,” (1840), See Ch. 15: Unlimited Power Of The 
Majority In The United States, And Its Consequences, see “Tyranny Of The Majority. … As 
majority taken collectively is only an individual, whose opinions, and frequently whose interests, 
are opposed to those of another individual, who is styled a minority. If it be admitted that a man 
possessing absolute power may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should not a 
majority be liable to the same reproach? Men do not change their characters by uniting with one 
another; nor does their patience in the presence of obstacles increase with their strength.” 
17James Madison, Federalist No. 10: "The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard 
Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." New York Daily Advertiser, November 22, 1787. 
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is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious 
individual.”  
The Conflict Between Majoritarianism And Judicial Elections 
 As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist 78, the remedy for this 
potential problem of the majoritarian will infringing upon the rights of the 
minority was to be found within the judiciary. Hamilton writes, “It is far more 
rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”18 In the following quote, note 
Hamilton’s emphasis on the necessity of an independent judiciary when he 
argues, that if limitations are to be placed on the legislature, there then has to 
exist an institution that can invalidate the legislature’s efforts to exceed the 
established limitations. Failure to have such an institution, Hamilton states, 
would render the limitations essentially impotent: 
“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly 
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I 
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the 
legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills 
of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this 
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the 
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all 
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. 
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges 
would amount to nothing.”19 
 
Hamilton also foresaw the issue of the counter-majoritarian difficulty with 
judicial review. Hamilton counters the criticisms of judicial review contained 
                                                     




within the counter-majoritarian difficulty by arguing that the court is not 
exercising judicial superiority by overturning legislation enacted by an elected 
body, but rather voiding what the legislature never had the authority to enact:  
“Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce 
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has 
arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a 
superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that 
the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must 
necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. 
… There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than 
that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the 
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, 
therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”20 
 
Hamilton further writes that the judiciary is not actually acting against the will of 
the people, but rather it is upholding the compacts that the people had previously 
made, amongst which is the supremacy of the Constitution. 21 
As Hamilton wrote when establishing the institutions of the federal 
government, the framers envisioned the judiciary as a bulwark between 
majoritarian dominance and individual rights. In this role the judiciary can 
ensure equitable protection of rights. While this may involve overturning 
legislation that is reflective of the will of the people, the invalidation was 
performed to respect a previous compact made between the people and its 
government, which includes constraints on the legislature and the supremacy of 
the constitution. 
                                                     
20 Id. 
21 Id. See, “Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the 
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where 
the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, 




However, this distinct disconnect between the electorate and the judiciary 
was not extended to the judicial institutions of most U.S. states. So while 
Hamilton may have been able to philosophically reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory nature of judicial review and majoritarianism, the situation is 
rather more muddled with state judiciaries. With state judicial elections, the 
delegation of duty between the legislature, designed to act as the people’s 
representatives, and the judiciary, designed to ensure that the legislature does 
not act in violation of its charter or in violation of the rights of the individual, 
becomes blurred.  
It is self-evident, due to the nature of elections, that by participating in 
elections judges must become cognizant of the Majoritarian Principle of 
Democracy. Or rather, by the very need to win elections judges must recognize 
electoral considerations.22 However, the consideration of electoral factors by the 
judiciary seems contradictory to the traditional understanding of a judge. As the 
Supreme Court wrote, the principle of a neutral and independent judiciary “dates 
back at least eight centuries to Magna Carta, which proclaimed, ‘To no one will 
we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.’ The same concept 
underlies the common law judicial oath, which binds a judge to ‘do right to all 
manner of people . . . without fear or favour, affection or ill-will,’ and the oath 
that each of us took to ‘administer justice without respect to persons, and do 
equal right to the poor and to the rich.’”23 
                                                     
22 While this conclusion logically follows from a theoretically viewpoint, a more in-depth 
analysis will be explored later in the paper to verify that judges do consider electoral factors.  
23  Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, S. Ct. 575 U.S. ____  (2015), p. 9 
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Advocates of judicial elections argue though that “the democracy-
respecting judge ought to draw upon public perceptions and the prevailing state 
political climate when resolving difficult disputes.”24 Herein lies the problem 
though, the need to be responsive to majority opinion and serve as a check 
against the “tyranny of the majority” presents a conundrum of purpose. Even the 
Supreme Court has recognized the “fundamental tension between the ideal 
character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral politics cannot be 
resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the popular will while 
simultaneously requiring them to run for elected office.”25 
While state judiciaries are not the only check against the “tyranny of the 
majority,” undermining the ability of the judiciary to perform this function could 
make it significantly more difficult for those outside of the majority to obtain 
corrective action should their rights be infringed. For a country that declared, 
“whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive to [an individual’s 
unalienable rights], it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it…,” an 
increased difficulty, or additional delay, in obtaining one’s restitution of rights 
should be a particular area of concern.26  
The Case For Judicial Elections 
As previously noted, the United States is the only constitutional democracy 
with judicial elections. The failure of other countries to adopt this singularity of 
the American system of government may be pointed to by critics of judicial 
elections as proof of the institution’s shortcomings. However, it was actually the 
                                                     
24 Chris Bonneau and Melinda Hall, In Defense of Judicial Elections (New York: Routledge, 2009) 
15 
25 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 US 380 (1991) p. 501 
26 U.S. Declaration of Independence, 1776 
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shortcomings of an unelected judiciary that birthed judicial elections in the 
United States, and the problems that necessitated the creation of judicial 
elections validate the merits of the institution. 
A prominent jurist once remarked that “dissatisfaction with the 
administration of justice is as old as law.”27 This maxim holds true for the United 
States since dissatisfaction of the American model of the judiciary is as old as the 
country itself. As debate swirled around the United States’ creation of a new 
government, numerous papers were published debating the various methods and 
structures that should compose the country’s new institutions. Those papers 
came to be known as the Federalist Papers and Anti-Federalist Papers. As 
opposed to James Madison in the Federalist Papers, Brutus, a pseudonym, 
argued in the Anti-Federalists Papers that the federal judicial system lacked any 
effective method of accountability and would be “exalted above all other power in 
the government, and subject to no control.” 28 Brutus further argued, “When 
great and extraordinary powers are vested in any man, or body of men” that may 
infringe upon the rights of the people, any of the empowered should be held 
“accountable to some superior for their conduct in office. — This responsibility 
should ultimately rest with the People.”29  
Discussing constitutional interpretation, Brutus noted that the 
constitution, which derives its power from the people, is to be interpreted by the 
branch of government that is least accountable to the people. Brutus wrote that 
with the other branches of government lacking any effective method of imposing 
                                                     
27 Roscoe Pound, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
Remarks at the American Bar Association, 8/29/1906 
28 Brutus, “The Power of the Judiciary,” New-York Journal, 3/20/1788 
29 Id.  
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accountability over the judiciary and the people having no remedy to prevent the 
encroachment of government through judicial precedent, there is no way left to 
control the judiciary “but with a high hand and an outstretched arm.”30 Clearly, 
from the inception of the nation there was recognition of a lack of majoritarian 
check on the judiciary. Although opposed to elections of judges as a whole, Brutus 
does propose the introduction of a legislative component into the judiciary by 
creating an elected “supreme controlling power” to oversee the judiciary. Brutus 
argued that the overseeing body should be elected because the failure to elect the 
controlling power would be “repugnant to the principles of a free government.”31 
Brutus was not alone in this position. Thomas Jefferson argued that making 
judges “dependent on none but themselves” ran counter to the principle of “a 
government founded on the public will.”32 While such an electoral component as 
advocated by Brutus has not been introduced into the federal judiciary, it would 
only be around 40 years later that the first state fully adopted an elected 
judiciary.33  
Initially, the states selected judges mainly through legislative or 
gubernatorial appointments.34 As populism became the zeitgeist of the 
Jacksonian era, electing judges gained support as an alternative to judicial 
appointments.35 The support for judicial elections arose in response to the 
                                                     
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, S. Ct. 575 U.S. ____  (2015), p. 21, citing “ The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson”  (P. Ford ed. 1905). 
33 Mississippi became the first state to adopt a system where all judges were elected, doing so in 
1832.  Sandra Day O'Connor, “Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan,” 74 Mo. L. Rev. 
(2009), p. 5 
34 Branstad, Phillips, and Olson, “A Coin On the Tracks,” 717 
35 Id.  
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perception that appointing judges enabled the appointing body to “award 
judgeships based on party loyalty rather than on legal ability, judicial 
temperament, or fair mindedness.”36 In response to the negative perceptions 
surrounding this method of judicial selection, in 1832 Mississippi adopted a 
method of judicial selection that relied entirely on elections, becoming the first 
state to do so. While judicial elections have received sustained scrutiny for their 
potential to create a biased judiciary, as it turns out, parallel criticism actually 
fathered judicial elections.   
In the many evolutions of judicial selection in the United States, the 
unifying theme behind the various calls for an improved method was the failure 
of the judiciary to adequately reflect majoritarian characteristics or the qualities 
necessary for majoritarian governance.37 The people’s frustration with the court 
system over its inability to adequately represent their beliefs speaks to the 
inherent conflict of a judiciary in a democracy – the aforementioned counter-
majoritarian difficultly. Named by Alexander Bickel, the issue at the heart of 
counter-majoritarianism is that if “democracy entails responsiveness to popular 
will, how to explain a branch of government whose members are unaccountable 
to the people, yet have the power to overturn popular decisions?” 38 For Bickel, a 
ruling by the court that struck down an act of the elected executive or legislature 
was not advancing the will of the people but actively opposing it.39 In the public’s 
mindset, majoritarianism has became equivalent with the democratic process 
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and for “democracy simply to entail majority.”40 The prominence of the counter-
majoritarian difficultly is surmised by Erwin Chmerinsky, who in 1989 called it 
"the dominant paradigm of constitutional law and scholarship, a paradigm that 
emphasizes the democratic roots of the American polity and that characterizes 
judicial review as at odds with American democracy.”41 
In the judiciary there is no status quo of absolute impartiality that is 
immediately compromised by the introduction of judicial elections. Justices have 
their own inherent biases and personal preferences, and whether intentional or 
not, justices can imprint these biases into the court’s ruling.42 In appointive 
systems of judicial selection, there is no effective method to remove judges that 
rule in a manner reflective of their own personal preferences and contrary to 
public opinion or case law, unless the actions of the judge are so egregious as to 
merit impeachment. With the introductions of judicial elections, judges can more 
easily be held accountable. Therefore judicial elections can actually act as a 
deterrent against using the court to advance a personal preference.43   As 
explained by Melinda Hall, “When public sentiment and the rule of law coincide, 
curbing the blatant display of judicial preferences is beneficial.”44 When 
“pressures from electoral politics” can force judges to “abandon their own 
political preferences and act in accordance with the rule of law, courts are 
strengthened and democracy is enhanced.”45 Further, with the premise that 
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judges have an inherent bias and that electoral factors can compel a judge to 
instead reflect the bias of a constituency, is it not more desirable in a democracy, 
though still not ideal, for the bias of the governed to supersede the bias of an 
individual? 
A mantra has developed when discussing judicial elections that judicial 
independence equates to a freedom from elections and judicial elections equates 
to jeopardizing the integrity of the judiciary.46 As the previous paragraph 
demonstrates though, judicial elections can help foster majoritarianism and 
enhance democracy while also helping to uphold the integrity of the judiciary. 
Judicial elections not only provide an avenue to hold judges accountable but also 
create “a recurring focal point with which to stimulate and structure 
constitutional deliberation.”47  
Judicial supremacy can lead to citizen passivity in relation to the judiciary. 
The inability of citizens to have an “active and ongoing [popular] control over the 
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law” helps breed this citizen 
passivity by denying the citizenry any meaningful input or connection to the 
judiciary.48 This creates more room for judicial overreach and leaves only those 
that have a direct interest to remain involved. Judicial elections, however, help 
establish a connection between the constituency and the judiciary since judges 
are forced to appear at campaign stops throughout their district and the 
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constituents learn about the about the functions of the court.49 As one judicial 
candidate noted, during a campaign stop Q&A, the first question he received was 
“what does the court of appeals do?”50 The answer seemed obvious to someone 
who spent a lifetime in law, but not to this casual observer of the legal process.   
Judicial elections provide the people an opportunity to participate in the 
legal process, demystify judges as “forbidding, black robed officials,” and most 
importantly in a representative democracy “they demonstrate that the courts 
serve the people in a community, and not just some antiquated legal text or 
esoteric professional code.”51 Additionally, judicial elections can bring the 
judiciary closer to its constituency by hastening the alignment “between judicial 
outputs and communal preferences” since mechanisms for public influence in 
appointive methods of judicial selection are slow and weak, thereby casting the 
public out of the judicial process in all but the most important matters.52 Further, 
judicial elections can legitimize the actions of the court since elections are one of 
the “central legitimating constitutional ideals” and repeatedly require the public’s 
consent.53  
 Having just overthrown the yoke of the English crown that possessed, and 
exercised, broad control over the judiciary in colonial America, the founding 
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fathers prioritized the protection of judicial independence.54 However, 
protections to ensure judicial independence can at the same time increase the 
independence of the judiciary from any form of accountability – be it to the 
electorate or to established law.55  
From the survey of literature discussed in this section, it can be seen that 
the criticism of the judicial selection process tends to increase when the 
complaints surrounding judicial selection involve issues that negatively impact 
majoritarian involvement or the adequate exercise thereof.  This can include the 
exclusion of the citizenry in judicial selection, the selection of judges beholden to 
legislatures or governors, and judicial selection that gives wide berth to the 
influence of other special interests.  This has led to a number of methods 
throughout the United States that incorporate electoral components while also 
attempting to limit the impact of additional actors seeking to influence the 
judiciary, though not always successfully.  
The issue of judicial elections presents a catch-22 for those seeking to 
solve the associated problems. Conducting judicial elections leads to the 
majoritarian difficulty, but offering no variation of a judicial election leads to the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty. The potential benefits of one system may 
outweigh its attached difficulty or the answer may lie in a hybrid of the two 
options which attempts to maximize the benefits of a judicial election while 
minimizing potential problems. To ensure states pursue and adopt the best 
method of judicial selection however, it is first necessary for policymakers to fully 
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understand all the consequences each method of selection may have. This means 
all the relevant information for each method of judicial selection needs to be 
disclosed so lawmakers and the public can make the most informed decision.  
Case Study: The Conundrum Of Purpose In Iowa 
Nowhere has the conundrum of purpose present in judicial elections, and 
the problems it conceives, been more evident recently than in the matter of 
Varnum v. Brien.56 The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously overturned the state’s 
1998 Defense of Marriage Act after six gay couples filed a lawsuit in 2006 because 
they had been denied marriage licenses. In the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 
opinion, authored over 200 years after the Federalist Papers were written, the 
Iowa justices rather conveniently address all of the issues from the Federalist 
Papers that were discussed previously in this paper and mirror the philosophy 
espoused by Hamilton regarding the role of the judiciary: 
In this case, we must decide if our state statute limiting civil 
marriage to a union between a man and a woman violates the Iowa 
Constitution, as the district court ruled. … A statute inconsistent 
with the Iowa Constitution must be declared void, even though it 
may be supported by strong and deep-seated traditional beliefs and 
popular opinion. … It is also well established that courts must, 
under all circumstances, protect the supremacy of the constitution 
as a means of protecting our republican form of government and 
our freedoms. … The idea that courts, free from the political 
influences in the other two branches of government, are 
better suited to protect individual rights was recognized at 
the time our Iowa Constitution was formed. …Our 
responsibility, however, is to protect constitutional rights of 
individuals from legislative enactments that have denied those 
rights, even when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, 
were at one time unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained 
practice or law viewed to be impervious to the passage of time. … 
While the constitution is the supreme law and cannot be altered by 
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the enactment of an ordinary statute, the power of the constitution 
flows from the people, and the people of Iowa retain the ultimate 
power to shape it over time. … We are convinced gay and lesbian 
people are not so politically powerful as to overcome the unfair and 
severe prejudice that history suggests produces discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. … Consequently, the language in Iowa 
Code section 595.2 limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman 
must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining statutory 
language must be interpreted and applied in a manner allowing gay 
and lesbian people full access to the institution of civil marriage.57 
[emphasis added] 
After the case was decided, the ruling received widespread media attention and 
political opponents immediately vowed to fight the court’s ruling.58 By 
happenstance, the very next year three of the Iowa justices were scheduled to be 
on the ballot for a retention election. From 2000 to 2008, $0 was spent on Iowa 
Supreme Court retention election campaigns. In the 2009-2010 election cycle, 
more than $1 million was spent.59 The Iowa Supreme Court justices did not form 
any campaign committees believing it would have “politicized and jeopardized 
the integrity of their judicial office.”60 Large political organizations, however, 
spent more than $900,000 on the race.61 Despite the court’s reference in its 
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opinion to being free from political influence, all three judges, appointed by 
Democratic and Republican governors, lost their election.62 
In the instance of the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court retention elections, both 
supporters of increased judicial independence and supporters of judicial elections 
have a reason to believe that the case highlights the basis for their cause. 
Proponents for greater judicial independence can highlight that the court 
correctly performed its role by recognizing and upholding the rights of 
homosexuals, a minority community, at the expense of the majority opinion. 
Additionally, these supporters can reasonably argue that the election’s outcome 
jeopardized the court’s ability to perform its role as a protector of rights in the 
future, which they would argue demonstrates the need for greater judicial 
independence. Indeed, one law review noted that the “Iowa anti-retention 
movement was a threat aimed to chill the decision making of judges in the 
future—in Iowa, and across the country.”63 An article in Time magazine with the 
title “Iowa Vote Shows the Injustice of Electing Judges,” stated that the election 
results “should send a shiver down the spine of anyone who cares about the 
American system of justice.”64 
Supporters of judicial elections can argue that system performed exactly as 
it was designed. The judiciary acted contrary to the desires of its constituency and 
the public used elections to hold the relevant actors accountable. Indeed, one 
supporter of judicial elections in Iowa said, “We have ended 2010 by sending a 
                                                     
62 For election results, see A.G. Salzburg, “Ouster Of Iowa Judges Send Signal To Bench,” The 
New York Times, 11/3/10, For partisan identification of governors that appointed the judges, 
see Adam Cohen, “Iowa Vote Shows The Injustice Of Electing Judges,” Time, 11/10/10 
63 Brandenburg and Berg, The New Storm, p. 712 
64 Adam Cohen, “Iowa Vote Shows The Injustice Of Electing Judges,” Time, 11/10/10 
25 
 
strong message for freedom to the Iowa Supreme Court and to the entire nation 
that activist judges who seek to write their own law won’t be tolerated any 
longer.”65 The aforementioned Time article about the outcome of the election said 
that, Opponents of gay marriage celebrated, confident that a miscarriage of 
justice had been corrected at the ballot box…”66 
Conclusion  
As one law review article noted when discussing the subject of judicial 
elections, “like it or not, elected judges are here to stay. … The public heartily 
approves of the practice: eighty percent of those polled favor filling judgeships 
through elections.”67 The popularity of judicial elections viewed in conjunction 
with the widespread institutionalization the practice already enjoys lends 
credence to this premise that judicial elections are not likely to be rolled back in 
the near future. Accepting this premise as a reality, whether this reality is 
congruent or incongruent with one’s preferences, shifts the trajectory of the 
discourse from the appropriateness of judicial elections to instead examining the 
best methods for judicial elections.  
This shift in perspective can be beneficial to public policy as this approach 
is likely to be more conducive in refocusing the issue to questions that can impact 
current policy development in the place of continuing to concentrate on an issue 
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with entrenched and established interests, like that of supporting or opposing the 
nature of judicial elections. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, it is no longer a 
question of if one supports judicial elections, but rather how best to reform the 
elections to one’s desired outcome. This clearly does not relegate the previously 
explored underlying tension into any degree of unimportance however, since it 
would logically follow that one’s desired reforms would reflect the advancement 
of the desired broader policy goals. 
There is a whole field of research and scores of academic literature focused 
exclusively on whether judicial elections are appropriate. The interests in this 
matter are well entrenched. To advance this debate in manner that can actually 
have an immediate impact on policy, it should be determined how successful 
judicial elections are at fulfilling their primary purpose of majoritarian 
accountability. So while the issues surmised in this chapter advance existing 
discourse little, it is necessary to address first so as to set the goal posts by which 
to measure the success of judicial elections.  
The same underlying tension between majoritarianism and the neutral 
adjudication of the law that fuels the debate about the propriety of judicial 
elections is the same underlying tension that propels the driving inquiry of this 
paper. That is because the issues examined here within are a byproduct of judicial 
elections and the appropriateness of extra-constituent contributions to support 
judicial elections is the manifestation of the philosophical conflict of purpose in 
judicial elections into the policy arena with real world impacts on current events. 
As such, the exploration of out-of-state contributions and majoritarian intent, to 
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be conducted in the second chapter of this paper, will further illuminate the 
broader debate about judicial elections and move the debate forward. 
Due to the conundrum of purpose created by the practice of judicial 
election, which creates an unstable foundation and uncertain purpose for the 
judiciary, if it is concluded that the elections are unable to fulfill the primary 
purpose of majoritarianism then the continuation of judicial elections should be 














Ch. 2 The Impact Of Elections On State 
Judiciaries 
The Role Of Money In Judicial Elections 
A fissure has developed between the intent of elections, which is to create 
majoritarian accountability and isolate the judiciary from legislative politics, and 
those working to influence judicial elections with money.68 This is especially 
problematic as the judicial branch is the weakest of the three branches of 
government. “Justice O'Connor points out that while the executive and the 
legislative branches wield the power of the sword and purse, respectively, the 
courts wield the power of the quill. The judicial power lies in the force of reason 
and the willingness of others to listen to that reason. With the increase in judicial 
election spending, judicial accusations, and the influx of politics into the 
courtroom, the legitimacy of the judicial branch, which rests entirely on its 
promise to be fair and impartial, will erode in the court of public opinion.” 69 If 
the citizenry is presented with the promise of judicial accountability, but not that 
reality of it, the legitimacy of the institution becomes compromised; endangering 
the institution in its entirety.  
Prior to the year 2000, the influence of money was not a primary area of 
concern in the study of state judicial elections. Studies on the methods of judicial 
selection focused on many of the same problems being discussed today, like low 
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voter turnout and how the different institutional structures impact court 
behavior, but mitigating the influence of donations was relatively absent.70 
Examinations of threats to judicial independence largely identified majoritarian 
considerations influencing judicial behavior or legislative bodies restricting 
judicial authority as the primary issues, but money was not flagged as a major 
threat to judicial independence.71 
Money began to play an increasingly prominent rule in judicial elections 
beginning early in the 2000s.72 Between 1990 and 1999 $83.3 million was spent 
on judicial elections.73 Between 2000 to 2009, the amount spent on judicial 
elections rose to 206.9 million.74 New state records were set for spending on state 
supreme court elections in 2007 and 2008.75 In the 2009-2010 election cycle, 
$2.8 million was spent on retention elections. Up until then, only $2.2 million 
had been spent on retention elections that entire decade.76  An analysis by the 
Brennan Center For Justice reported that judicial elections in 12 states involved 
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spending of over $1 million during the 2011 – 2012 election cycle.77 In the 2011-
2012 election cycle, the most expensive high-court elections were in four states 
where the judiciary was closely divided by judicial philosophy.78 All this evidence 
illustrates a portrait of judicial elections becoming more infused with large 
campaign spending.  
The increase in election spending has been marked by a few dominant 
groups responsible for a large portion of the money spent. Money has 
traditionally come from two main sources in judicial elections, business interests 
and lawyers, but since 2000 additional special interest groups have become a 
significantly larger source of contributions.79 38.7% of the money spent in 2009-
2010 judicial elections came from just ten groups.80 On state supreme court races 
alone, interest groups independently spent $15.4 million in 2011- 12.81 97% of the 
contributions by the top 10 largest donors in the 2011- 2012 judicial elections 
went towards independent expenditures instead of direct contributions.82 
Attempting To Measure Whether The Reality Of Judicial Elections 
Reflects The Majoritarian Intent Of Elections 
Starting with a 2004 election in Missouri, judicial elections have 
sometimes served as a vehicle to highlight divisive issues in an attempt to ‘turn 
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out the base’ and increase voter turnout to advance non-judicial elections. 83 In 
such instances, judicial elections only served as a platform to advance non-
judicial actors. The intent behind such campaign strategies does not appear to be 
the advancement of justice or ensuring the people’s ideology is reflected in the 
state judiciary.  
With such tactics being employed and the explosion of money in judicial 
elections by a relatively few independent groups there should be a parallel 
increase in the scrutiny of contributions to judicial elections. While there has 
been an increase in the study of judicial elections and the role of money as a 
whole, there has been little discourse on, or examination of, the impact out-of-
state money has on elections and court adjudication. Understanding that the 
majoritarian principle of democracy links elections to the will of the people, it is 
then worthwhile to examine if the role of out-of-state money is reinforcing or 
damaging the majoritarian aspect of elections. As judicial elections are already a 
controversial event, if the elections are no longer ensuring the judiciary is 
reflective of its constituency, then it would become increasingly difficult to 
advocate for their continued existence after the main justification for judicial 
elections has been nullified.  
As explored in chapter one, judicial elections by their nature exist in a 
precarious position where elected judges must serve two different and opposing 
goals. The introduction of an additional complicating factor, like a rapid influx of 
money serving as an accelerant to exacerbating preexisting conflicts by creating 
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an additional consideration, the appeasement of donors, for judges when 
adjudicating may destabilize the precarious balance of opposing goals eroding the 
capacity of a state judiciary to fulfill any of its now many goals. 
Out-of-state campaign contributions pose a particularly interesting risk in 
that the donor is not a constituent of the court and there is no guarantee the 
contribution is being made to advance an interest of the constituency. One of the 
main arguments for judicial elections is that elections create judicial 
accountability and advance majoritarian principles. As two prominent 
proponents of judicial elections write, “The democracy-respecting judge ought to 
draw upon public perception.”84 
 However, as judges become more reliant on money to maintain their 
judgeship the importance of maintaining a strong donor base concurrently 
becomes more important. 85 When judges become reliant upon collecting large 
campaign contributions that maintain the judge’s own career and economic 
stability a dangerous conflict of interest is created. Judges must consider 
potentially impinging their own well-being to preserve the rights of an individual 
before the bench.  
This conflict-of-interest, between judicial independence and judicial self-
interest, is not a problem without precedent in America. On the contrary, it was 
one of the issues that helped conceive the United States. In the Declaration of 
Independence, all 13 states unanimously agreed that one of the acts of the King 
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that had caused “repeated injuries and usurpations” was that the King had “made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the 
amount and payment of their salaries.” The judges, dependent upon the king for 
their salary and continuation of employment, would not be inclined to rule 
against him. It is now seen in the judiciary of the modern era, in order to be 
elected, judges are made dependent on financial donations. As money has risen 
in prominence and becomes increasingly necessary to be elected, judges are 
dependent on those who can provide financial resources for electioneering 
efforts. As seen, those who have the resources and are willing to make such 
contributions are largely from a small group of independent expenditure groups. 
This prompts the question, are judges representing their constituency or their 
financial benefactors? 
Independent expenditure committees, often referred to as super PACs, 
“may raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and 
individuals, then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political 
candidates.”86 The groups must disclose their donor in reports regularly filed 
with the FEC, however, there are no limits or restrictions on the source of the 
contributions.87 In this manner, it has become possible to disclose the source of 
the contribution without disclosing the actual origin of the money.  
“A donor may give unlimited amounts to a nonprofit social welfare 
organization or a business association. These organizations, as well 
as labor unions, can in turn contribute funds to a Super PAC, which 
is allowed to receive unlimited contributions from tax-exempt 
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organizations and other entities and use them to pay for their 
independent expenditures. A Super PAC is required to disclose only 
the amount and source of an organizational gift; it is not required to 
disclose the donors who provided the funding to the organization in 
the first place. In this way, intermediary groups can serve as 
vehicles for masking the actual donors funding campaign- related 
expenditures. They can function as pass-throughs to veil 
contributions from public view.”88 
Additionally, after Citizens United, 501(c)4s have become another alternative 
route to disguise the originating source of a contribution.89 501(c)4s are tax 
exempt “social welfare” organizations that also must disclose their donors, but 
like super PACs can become a vehicle to shield the original source of the money.90 
 Using these types of financial arrangements, determining the original 
source of contributions becomes more akin to a shell game where the 
contribution is shuffled amongst multiple organizations. The Brennan Center, 
which has studied spending in state judicial elections every year since 2000, 
described attempting to identity the donors’ donors as such: 
“Many of the top-spending special interest groups in 2011–12 
shrouded their agendas and donor lists in secrecy. Names like the 
‘Greater Wisconsin Committee’ and the ‘North Carolina Judicial 
Coalition’ leave ordinary citizens hard-pressed to identify spenders’ 
ideological or political agendas. Efforts to delve deeper by looking 
into the ‘donors’ donors’ result in varying degrees of additional 
clarity. In many cases, reviewing donor lists is like peeling back the 
layers of an onion, as the next level of contributors contains names 
of more umbrella groups. In other cases, attempting to go deeper 
leads to a dead end, as weak state disclosure laws and provisions of 
the federal tax code allow donors to avoid scrutiny.”91  
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In this manner, it becomes effectively impractical to catalogue all the original 
donors in a judicial election. Without knowing the source of contributions it then 
becomes a feat of impossibility to empirically determine whether the court’s 
behavior is modified to benefit the court’s out-of-state donors. As a result, it 
cannot be verified or disproven through this method if out-of-state contributions 
have a direct causation on judicial adjudication that is not reflective of 
majoritarian intent. As such, the proponent of judicial elections should be as 
equally concerned as the opponents by the influx of undisclosed money because 
the proponents lack the evidence to verify that judicial elections are fulfilling 
their intended majoritarian intent.  
Legislative v. Judiciary: Why The Problems Of Money In Elections Are 
Amplified In Judicial Elections 
 The increasing prominence of money in elections and the skilled use of 
loopholes in campaign finance regulations is not a problem isolated to the 
judiciary. Legislative races have frequently been the target of criticism regarding 
money in elections, especially in a post Citizens United world.92 And many of the 
problems associated with money in elections that were addressed in the second 
portion of this paper are shared concerns in legislative elections as well.  
However, there are institutional consequences that are unique to the judiciary, 
which is why campaign finance regulation in judicial elections deserves special 
attention and why an individual’s standard opinions on campaign finance 
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regulation should not by default be transferred to judicial elections without 
additional reflection.  
 The most apparent unique conflict would be the intent of the institution. 
Operating under the premise of the majoritarian principle of democracy, an 
election should reflect the opinion of the dominant group. In regards to the 
legislative branch, at a basic level, this reflection of the majority would seem 
proper as the legislature is supposed to “have an immediate dependence on, and 
an intimate sympathy, the people,” notwithstanding the complexities of the 
restrictions placed upon the legislative branch.93 Representing the will of the 
people is not foremost function of the judiciary branch though, as explored in the 
first part of this paper.  It is on this conundrum of purpose, the need to be 
responsive to majority opinion and serve as a check against the “tyranny of the 
majority,” that the unstable foundation of judicial elections is built upon. All the 
standard controversies associated with money in elections are amplified because 
it creates the possibility of distracting the judiciary from its primary function as 
well as weakening majoritarian accountability.  
Another factor unique to the judicial branch is that the judiciary is 
considered the weakest of the three branches in terms of exercising its authority. 
The legislative branch has the power of the purse, the executive branch has the 
power of the sword, but the judicial branch only has the power of wisdom; it is 
thus reliant upon voluntary compliance of its decisions by the public and other 
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branches of government.94 A tenuous power whose limits have been exposed by 
President Andrew Jackson’s famous decision to ignore the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Worcester v. Georgia and then taunt Chief Justice Marshall about it.95 
Consequently, the judicial branch has had to strategically work throughout its 
existence to build institutional legitimacy and a decline in public support can 
erode the judiciary’s credibility threatening the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate 
unpopular, yet constitutionally accurate, opinions.96 As such, to preserve the 
institution of the judiciary extra assurances must be takes to ensure that its 
reputation is not impugned without just cause. 
Perception of corruption, by the very nature of perception, is rooted in 
whether an individual believes there is corruption and not whether corruption 
actually exists. Consequently, the public’s opinion that money in the judiciary 
causes corruption can be just as damaging, in terms of institutional legitimacy, as 
whether money actually causes corruption. As the Supreme Court itself has 
recognized, a court’s “authority depends in large measure on the public’s 
willingness to respect and follow its decisions. Public perception of judicial 
integrity is accordingly ‘a state interest of the highest order.’” 97 Or, as phrased by 
Justice Frankfurter, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”98 
A survey of multiple polls indicates that 67% to 90% of the public, 
depending on the wording of the poll, are concerned that contributions negatively 
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impact court decisions.99 Judicial elections are often associated with having a 
number of harmful effects on perceptions of the court. Out of negative ads, 
judicial position taking and campaign contributions, it is campaign contributions 
that has the largest negative impact on the public’s perception of the court’s 
legitimacy.100 It is when judges are perceived as self-interested in their pursuit of 
contributions that the public finds it most objectionable and has the biggest 
negative impact on the public’s perception of the court.101 The damaging effect 
money has on the judiciary is evidenced by the fact that individuals in states that 
elect judges have a lower approval rating of the judiciary than states with other 
methods of judicial selection.102 Individuals in states with partisan judicial 
elections, the type of judicial selection where the most money is spent, are the 
most inclined to have an unfavorable view of courts and agree judges are just 
politicians in robes.103 
While it can be perceived that money in judicial elections is damaging the 
legitimacy of the institution, to further determine how the problems of money in 
elections are amplified in judicial elections it becomes helpful to determine if 
electoral considerations actually have any effect on judicial behavior. If it can be 
demonstrated that judges do consider electoral factors in the adjudication of a 
case, then contributions, being a necessary resource in an election, would be one 
such factor judges would be likely to consider. By the same logic, the 
consideration of contributions viewed in conjunction with the growing 
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importance of money would suggest that the contributors would also be a 
consideration of growing importance. This would mean that the interests of 
donors would have a growing role in the adjudication of a case as opposed to the 
judiciary’s role as a neutral arbitrator.  
 Evidence strongly indicates that judges do consider electoral factors when 
presiding over a case. Voters are more likely to negatively react to a sentence of 
the court that under punishes an individual than a sentence that is overly harsh-- 
judges realize this when deciding a case.104 One study that examined sentencing 
in Pennsylvania found that sentences become significantly longer the closer the 
verdict is to the judge’s next election.105  Judges are 15% more likely to give the 
death sentence to criminal defendants during an election year.106 Evidence also 
suggests that judges consider the ideology of their electorate. Judges in 
Republican districts tend to decide cases in ways that mirror Republican policies 
and judges in Democratic districts do the same for Democratic policies. Judges 
that identify as conservative vote more liberal in liberal areas and vice versa for 
liberal judges in conservative areas. Interestingly, this behavior is not found in 
judges that are not seeking reelection.107 Judges in partisan elections already 
have a perceived ideology by the public and so are not as easily defined by a 
couple high salience cases. However, judges in retention or non-partisan 
elections are more susceptible to being easily defined and their votes tend to 
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reflect their electorate’s opinion much more so than judges in partisan 
elections.108  
 Additionally, judges consider voter and donor potential when making 
court decisions. Judges that are elected tend to side with in-state parties more 
frequently than out of state litigants because in-state parties can vote.109 110 One 
study found evidence indicating that donors tend to win in court more frequently 
than non-donors.111 While not definitive, evidence suggests that businesses 
receive favorable treatment in partisan races - the most expensive type of 
election. This trend is not found in appointed or nonpartisan elected judges. This 
suggests that partisan elected judges are aware of the deeper resources 
businesses have available to spend for or against the judge.112  
 These studies strongly indicate that judges do consider electoral 
circumstances when making their decisions. As money is an important factor in 
judicial elections this evidence suggests that judges would be influenced by 
money when deciding a case. As previously noted, the role of money is increasing 
and so consequently the risk that judges place more importance on the 
consideration of money also increases.113 While much of the literature is not 
definitive in their conclusions, the consistency of evidence across multiple studies 
                                                     
108 Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom Clark, and Jee-Kwang Park, “Judicial Independence and 
Retention Elections,” 225-228 
109 Deborah Goldberg, “Interest Group Participation In Judicial Elections,” 76 
110 This also presents an interesting problem. Out-of-state contributions may bias a judge to act 
against the will of the the electorate. However, if out-of-state parties in an action are at an 
inherently disadvantage then such contributions may actually be an equalizer in favor of fair 
adjudication, even though it comes at the expense of majoritarian accountability.  
111 Shira Goodman, “The Danger Inherent the Public Perception that Justice is for Sale,” Drake 
Law Review 60 no. 3 (2012): 813 
112 Michael LeRoy, “Do Partisan Elections of Judges Produce Unequal Justice When Courts 
Review Employment Arbitrations,” 95 no. 5 (2010): 1604-1605 
113 Deborah Goldberg, “Interest Group Participation In Judicial Elections,” 74-75 
41 
 
is compelling. Provided this compelling evidence it can be reasonably concluded 
that judges do consider electoral factors and that the necessity for large 
contributions is one such factor. Further, it can be reasonably concluded that 
such considerations impact judicial decisions and that, the necessity for money in 
judicial elections being one such consideration, judges will modify their behavior 
to ensure the availability of large donors.  
While this modification of judicial behavior can be perceived as acting 
against the interest of neutral and fair arbitration, it still has yet to be 
demonstrated that this will also encourage behavior that is incongruent with 
majoritarian will. There are, however, characteristics unique to judicial elections 
that exacerbates the influence of money in a manner that enables money, and by 
extension the donors, to have an outsized influence in judicial elections and 
plausibly raises the specter that judges will adjudicate to reflect the preferences of 
the donors. If the donors are out-of-state then, this raises the problem that the 
court is not acting in favor of an in-state interest or the electorate’s preferences. 
Meaning that the judiciary can be incentivized to rule in a manner that is entirety 
not within in the interests of its constituency.   
Judicial elections tend to be characterized by a low-information electorate 
and tend to have low-voter participation. 114  The lack of knowledge among the 
electorate means an interest group can more easily define a judge by just a few of 
their controversial cases. Incumbent judges are then much more susceptible to 
negative ads than candidates in a legislative race. Further, the low-voter turnout 
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means that it would only take a minor increase in a candidate’s supporters or 
opponents to shift the outcome of an election. The result of these factors is that it 
is far easier in a judicial election to distort the perception of a judge and spend 
money to increase turnout by a sufficient enough margin to alter the election’s 
outcome.  
Taking these factors into consideration, contributions in judicial elections 
deserve a higher-level scrutiny than other elections. Large sums of cash from 
unknown sources are being infused into judicial elections at an increasing high 
level. These elections are particularly vulnerable to outside influence due to their 
low-information and low-voter participation nature. With the small turnout, it 
only takes a slight increase in partisan mobilization to sway the entire election in 
a manner that is not reflective of the majoritarian will. Meaning that, even though 
judicial elections threaten the public perception of the judiciary, and thereby 
undermine the institution as a whole, and threaten the rights of an individual, it 
is still possible that majoritarian preferences may not even be reflected in a 
judicial election.  
Caperton And The Additional Danger Of Anonymous Donors In 
Judicial Election 
It is in this perilous state of judicial elections – in which judicial elections 
necessitate numerous potential harms to justice without the guarantee of 
majoritarian accountability– that the question of untraceable contributions 
should be considered.  
The controversy in the matter of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. begins 
after a jury in West Virginia delivered a $50 million verdict against A.T. Massey 
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Coal Co. in 2002.115 While the case was on appeal, the CEO of Massey became 
involved in the reelection of one of the judges on the assigned appellate court. 
The CEO created a non-profit corporation and spent $3 million to support the 
challenger. The amount spent by the CEO was more than the total amount spent 
by all of the challenger’s other donors and the challenger’s own campaign. The 
challenger won the election and then refused to recuse himself when the 
Caperton matter reached the appellate court. The court overturned the $5o 
million verdict on a 3-2 vote. The new judge was one of the deciding votes in 
overturning the ruling. In 2009, the Supreme Court heard the case and ruled that 
the conflict of interest was so extreme it violated the plaintiff’s due process. In the 
majority opinion, the Court wrote, “The inquiry centers on the contribution's 
relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the 
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such 
contribution had on the outcome of the election.”116 The Court goes on to write 
that “Whether Blankenship’s campaign contributions were a necessary and 
sufficient cause of Benjamin’s victory is not the proper inquiry. Much like 
determining whether a judge is actually biased, proving what ultimately drives 
the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely to 
lend itself to a certain conclusion. … Due process requires an objective inquiry 
into whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the 
circumstances ‘would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to … 
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lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’”117 Which is to say that 
there need not be proof of actual corruption or bias by a judge to violate an 
individual’s due proceeds, but only that a contributor’s role in funding a 
campaign be significant enough so as to invite doubt that the average judge 
would be able to adjudicate objectively.  
With Supreme Court precedent establishing that the size of a contribution 
from a single individual can create an apparent conflict of interest and violate the 
due process of a litigant, it follows that there is compelling interest in knowing 
the donors of judicial elections. Without this transparency, it remains possible for 
an individual to feed large amounts of contributions into a single judicial 
campaign. In such an occurrence, a potentially disadvantaged litigant would not 
be aware of the violation of due process and would not be in a position to appeal 
the matter, like the plaintiff in Caperton was able to. Caperton reveals an existing 
clear and present threat to both majoritarian accountability and the rights of an 
individual.  
Conclusion 
Judicial elections operate in a precarious environment because of the 
conundrum of purpose their very existence causes. In a constitutional democracy, 
limits are placed on the will of the people and on the legislature to protect the 
rights of the individual. In order to nullify overreaching legislation, the judiciary 
is charged with judicial review. The power of judicial review to overrule the 
legislature and the long term limits that many state judges enjoy helped create a 
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narrative of a judicial oligarchy.118 Judicial elections became a popular method to 
counterbalance this perceived judicial supremacy. However with judicial 
elections, the judiciary is subject to the same majority will that it is charged to 
guard against. As a result, the judiciary is placed in the precarious position of 
executing two contradictory responsibilities – protecting rights, even of the 
unpopular, while reflecting the popular will.  
As a result of this conundrum of purpose, judicial elections are a 
contentious issue and the merits and disadvantages of such a system have been 
intimately reviewed in the annals of political science for decades. Despite the 
ongoing debate in academia, judicial elections remain popular and deeply 
entrenched in the institutions of a large majority of states. In an attempt to 
advance the debate, it becomes pragmatic to accept the continued existence of 
judicial elections in the immediate future. This allows the debate to instead focus 
on how the issues of the broader debate function within the mechanics of judicial 
elections. By focusing on the mechanics, one is more likely to influence policy 
development and thereby advance their own perspective on the broader issues. 
One particularly salient issue, which has been increasing in prominence 
over the last decade, is the role of money in judicial elections.  As money has 
grown in relevance in judicial elections it has received an increasing amount of 
scrutiny in academic literature, especially after three Iowa Supreme Court 
justices were voted out of office. Despite the copious amount of recent literature 
focusing on the rise of money in judicial elections, there has been little discourse 
on the influence of out-of-state money in state judicial elections.  
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Since judicial elections are meant to create majoritarian accountability, 
out-of-state campaign contributions should be an area of particular concern. The 
evidence strongly indicates that judges consider electoral factors when presiding 
over a case. One factor that has dramatically increased in prominence is the need 
for large amounts of money in a judicial campaign. The main source of judicial 
campaign contributions tends to be large donations from advocacy organizations.  
If the campaign contributions are coming from out-of-state then there is the 
potential that the judge will be considering the preference of the donor and not 
any interest within the judge’s constituency. Judicial elections are low-
information and low-turnout elections and so are more easily manipulated by 
outside influence then legislative elections. These factors create the possibility 
that out-of-state contributions can influence elections, and alter the outcome, in a 
manner that is incongruent with the preferences of the electorate. 
As such, it is a worthwhile endeavor to study the influence, if any, of out-
of-state contributions. If out-of-state contributions are found to influence judicial 
performance in a manner that does not parallel the preference of the electorate 
then this should be a cause for concern amongst both the advocates and 
opponents of judicial elections. If however, no such correlation were established, 
those that support judicial elections and those that support unlimited spending in 
elections would have their position bolstered. Studying the influence of out-of-
state contributions is therefore an effort that parties on both sides of the issue 
would have a vested interest in supporting.  
 As explored though, any serious effort to systematically catalogue the 
source of campaign contributions in judicial elections is impeded because of the 
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lax state of campaign finance laws in states and the prominent use of 
independent expenditure groups to shield the sources of money. Consequently, it 
is not possible to know the influence these campaign contributions are having on 
an electoral system that impacts the majority of court proceedings in the United 
States.  
This problem of out-of-state judicial elections is further exacerbated by the 
issues demonstrated in the matter of Caperton. The Supreme Court has 
established it is possible for a large enough contribution by a single source to 
create an appearance of undue influence and violate the rights of the opposing 
litigant. Not only is this a major problem that independent expenditure groups 
are able to mask the true size and source of contributions, but when considering 
out-of-state contributions, it could actively harm the interest of a constituent for 
the benefit of an out-of-state donor.  
 All these issues give legitimate cause for concern that the main 
justification for judicial elections, majoritarian intent, could potentially be 
nullified. For these reasons, it is the conclusion of this chapter that there is a 
serious need for increased campaign finance regulations in state judicial elections 
that increases the transparency surrounding donors in state judicial elections. 
Additional regulations will improve efficacy and enable the influence of out-of-
state contributions in state judicial elections to be seriously examined. Without it, 
millions of dollars will continue to flow unabated into the judiciary without any 





Ch. 3 Dark Money In Black Robes  
“At almost the same time last week that a Florida mailman was landing a 
gyrocopter in front of the U.S. Capitol to protest the influence of the wealthy 
on politics, New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie was getting pressed about the 
same topic at a town hall meeting in Londonderry, N.H. ‘I think what is 
corrupting in this potentially is we don’t knowski  where the money is 
coming from,’ Christie (R) told Valerie Roman of Windham, N.H. The two 
moments, occurring 466 miles apart, crystallized how money in politics is 
unexpectedly a rising issue in the 2016 campaign”.  
– The Washington Post, 4/19/15 
119  
Reforming Campaign Finance In State Judicial Elections 
Having been covered by the mainstream media, discussed by likely 
presidential candidates, and protested through over-the-top demonstrations – 
unlike a protesting gyrocopter pilot – money in politics has not been flying under 
the radar. Though the issue of money in politics has received widespread and 
frequent attention by members of the media and politicians, the rise of large 
individual donors and “dark money” is often addressed in the context of national 
elections, but these campaign finance issues extend to state judicial elections as 
well.  
The influx of contributions in state judicial elections from an unknown 
source has no parallel on the federal level and so has not received the same level 
of national media coverage as has legislative or executive elections. On the federal 
level, there are no judicial elections, but instead judges are appointed to the 
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bench, often for life tenures. The intent behind this method of judicial selection, 
as discussed previously, is to minimize the potential for judges to be 
inappropriately influenced by individuals that hold sway over the judge’s 
livelihood.   
This is not the case in many states. 39 states require judges to participate 
in some style of an election and these state judicial elections have not been 
exempt from the national trend of large donors that are willing to finance 
increasingly expensive elections. As judges are intended to be unbiased 
arbitrators, the reliance on large donors for a judge’s livelihood raises the 
prospect for a potential conflict of interest; especially in the instance where a 
large donor has contributed to a judge that is presiding over a matter that the 
donor is a direct participant in or has a vested stake in.  
As the Court has recognized contributions to issues surrounding an 
election are an expression of free speech – though that does not extent to direct 
contributions to political campaigns – it could be reasonably argued by many that 
restricting contributions solely on the unproven basis of a potential to corrupt 
would be an arbitrary and capricious limitation on an individual’s rights.  
The problem arises, however, that dark money prevents any 
comprehensive study to determine if large donors have any measurable influence 
on judicial behavior. Consequently, with the presence of dark money in state 
judicial elections it becomes impossible to know whether a presiding judge had 
benefited from election spending by one of the litigants involved in the matter or 
from a donor that has a significant interest in the outcome of the case.  This 
should raise significant concerns about the ability of a judge to remain an 
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unbiased party during adjudication. However, in the interest of preserving 
liberties and preventing unnecessary burdens to the free exercise thereof, the 
method of addressing these concerns should be no more restrictive than 
necessary, if any restriction is necessary at all. With the presence of dark money 
however, the extent of parties with a vested interest in the outcome of a case that 
are also substantial contributors to the election efforts of a presiding judge is 
unknown. Consequently, the necessitated scope of any potential regulation to 
address the issue cannot be determined.  
With the problem of judges potentially presiding over cases involving 
individuals that significantly benefited the judge’s election efforts, the conflict of 
interest that such an occurrence would present, and the inability of the public 
and participants before the court to determine the extent of this issue there is a 
significant need for states to mandate additional disclosure and illuminate the 
infusion of dark money in state judicial elections.  
Legal Basis For A Legislative Remedy 
 Having recognized that there exists a substantial potential for impropriety 
and conflicts of interests to arise through the use of dark money in state judicial 
elections and that there continues to be significant gaps of knowledge about the 
extent of dark money in state judicial elections, it can be reasonably determined 
that a legislative remedy is necessitated to ameliorate these issues. However, 
there have been significant rollbacks in the campaign finance regulation 
framework by the Supreme Court.120 The Court has repeatedly struck down 
existing campaign finance laws in favor of erring on the side of freedom of speech 
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in relation to election contributions. Before designing what type of remedy is best 
suited to resolve the issue of dark money in judicial elections, it must first be 
determined whether there exists a legal basis for such a remedy. It is argued that 
due to the unique role of the judiciary, election regulations that may not satisfy 
legal requirements when applied to executive or legislative elections would be 
compliant and upheld when tested against any constitutional threshold because 
of the extra level of scrutiny protecting judicial elections merits. Fortunately, 
shortly before the completion of this paper, the Supreme Court ruled in Williams-
Yulee v. Florida Bar, in which many of the issues addressed in this paper are 
examined. The Court’s opinion supports many of the positions argued here.121  
The increasing prominence of money in elections and the skilled use of 
loopholes in campaign finance regulations is not a problem isolated to the 
judiciary. Legislative races have frequently been the target of criticism regarding 
money in elections, especially in a post Citizens United world.122 However, there 
are institutional consequences that are unique to the judiciary, which is why 
campaign finance regulation in judicial elections deserves special attention and 
why an individual’s standard opinions on campaign finance regulation should not 
be immediately transferable to judicial elections without additional reflection. 
In regards to the legislative branch, at a basic level, this reflection of the 
majority would seem proper as the legislature is supposed to “have an immediate 
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy, the people,” notwithstanding the 
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complexities of the restrictions placed upon the legislative branch.123 
Representing the will of the people is not foremost function of the judiciary 
branch though. As the Supreme Court has affirmed, “Politicians are expected to 
be appropriately responsive to the preferences of their supporters. Indeed, such 
‘responsiveness is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected 
officials.’ The same is not true of judges. In deciding cases, a judge is not to follow 
the preferences of his supporters, or provide any special consideration to his 
campaign donors. A judge instead must ‘observe the utmost fairness,’ striving to 
be ‘perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or controul 
him but God and his conscience.’”124 More succinctly, the Court writes, “Judges 
are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot.”125 
Even though judges in the states with judicial elections must be responsive to the 
viewpoints of the citizenry, representation is still not their foremost duty. It is on 
this conundrum of purpose, the need to be responsive to majority opinion and yet 
first and foremost serve as a check against the “tyranny of the majority,” that the 
unstable foundation of judicial elections is built upon. All the standard 
controversies associated with money in elections are amplified because it creates 
the possibility of distracting the judiciary from its primary function as well as 
weakening majoritarian accountability. This difference between judicial elections 
and other elections and the need to treat campaign finance regulations differently 
for judicial elections is recognized by the Court, which ruled “our precedents 
applying the First Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the 
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issues here.”126  
One of the consequences of the unique role of judicial elections, when 
compared to the legislative or executive elections, is the need to uphold the 
public’s confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. As discussed at length in 
chapter 2, the public’s perception in the judiciary is vital to the ability of the 
courts to carry out their duty because the judiciary “has no influence over either 
the sword or the purse; . . . neither force nor will but merely judgment. The 
judiciary’s authority therefore depends in large measure on the public’s 
willingness to respect and follow its decisions.”  127 The problem of campaign 
contributions and judicial elections is exacerbated by this need to preserve a 
perception of integrity, with the Court having written “the mere possibility that 
judges’ decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributions 
is likely to undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”128 In other words, 
there does not actually have to be proof of corruption, but merely the perception 
of corruption in judicial elections to justify regulations aimed at preserving the 
public’s belief in the integrity of the judiciary.129 The Court wrote that “This 
Court’s precedents have recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding 
‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges,’” 
and so to protect this vital state interest states may implement regulations in 
recognition that judges “charged with exercising strict neutrality and 
independence, cannot supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public 
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confidence in judicial integrity.”130  
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that “A State’s decision to elect judges does 
not compel it to compromise public confidence in their integrity. … [A] State’s 
interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary extends 
beyond its interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and 
executive elections. As we explained in White, States may regulate judicial 
elections differently than they regulate political elections, because the role of 
judges differs from the role of politicians. …  
In sum, because Canon 7C(1) is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest, the First Amendment poses no obstacle to its enforcement 
in this case.”131 This case especially stands out because it runs counter to the 
momentum of recent Supreme Court decisions which have generally stuck down 
campaign finance regulations.  
Recognition that regulations surrounding judicial elections should be 
treated differently than other types of election is not isolated to William-Yulee. 
Additionally, there is the matter of Hugh Caperton, et al. v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Company, Inc., et al. In this case, the Court found that a judge had received such 
“an extraordinary amount” of campaign contributions from an individual that the 
judge should have recued himself when that same individual had matter before 
the court because it violated judicial objective standards that “the probability of 
actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be 
                                                     
130 Id, p. 9  
131 Id. p. 4, 5, and 9  
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constitutionally tolerable.”132 In its decision, the Supreme Court made note that 
the contributor had not only made direct donations, but also donated $2.5 
million to a 527 group that supported the judge that would hear the contributor’s 
appeal. The contributor also spent $500,000 on independent expenditures. The 
judge would win that election and then become the deciding vote in the appeal 
which overturned the previous $50 million ruling against the contributor. So not 
only has the court recognized that special regulations are permissible for judicial 
elections, it has recognized that independent expenditures can impact a judge’s 
impartiality. If these contributions would have been made to an 501(c)(4) group, 
the Court would never have known about the contributions and may not have 
overturned the case in which it ruled the sizeable contributions violated the other 
party’s due process. As such, it is vital that transparency surrounds money in 
judicial elections.  
Additionally, the Supreme court did not find an example of quid pro quo 
corruption which is the standard established in Citizens United v. FEC. Instead, 
the Court cited precedent that is was “not required to decide whether in fact [the 
justice] was influenced.” 133 The Court recognized that “The inquiry is an 
objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively134 
biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neural, or 
whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.”  It found, even though 
there was absent sufficient evidence of quid pro quo, that “Though not a bribe or 
                                                     
132 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) p. 1 
133 Id. see p. 9 
134 Id. see p. 11 
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criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude 
to [the contributor] for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.”135 
The concerns move beyond a mere appearance of impropriety and become 
reality of a conflict of interest when considering judges may directly preside over 
a case involving a major donor in an scenario that is not transferable to the 
legislature where the approval process is spread among numerous individuals. As 
judges become more reliant on money to maintain their judgeship the 
importance of maintaining a strong donor base concurrently becomes more 
important. 136 When judges become reliant upon collecting large campaign 
contributions that maintain the judge’s own career and economic stability a 
dangerous conflict of interest is created. Judges must consider potentially 
impinging their own well-being to preserve the rights of an individual before the 
bench. As the Supreme Court has ruled previously, “no man can be a judge in his 
own case, and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the 
outcome.”137 However, because of campaign contributions judges are being 
requested to do just that.  
Judicial elections are not a salient issue for the general population and 
they may not be highly informed of the issues surrounding a particular race. 
However, it is not the public’s knowledge of particular judicial candidates or races 
that is relevant to the issue of money in judicial elections, it is their perception of 
how money impacts judicial elections that matters. Indeed, in its Caperton ruling 
the Supreme Court noted in its ruling that “the results of a public opinion poll, 
                                                     
135 Id.  
136 Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth McGregor, “Judicial Selection Principles” 1742-1743 
137 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) 
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which indicated that over 67% of West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin 
would be fair and impartial.”138  
As previously discussed, a survey of multiple polls indicates that 67% to 
90% of the public, depending on the wording of the poll, are concerned that 
contributions negatively impact court decisions.139 Judicial elections are often 
associated with having a number of harmful effects on perceptions of the court. 
Out of negative ads, judicial position taking and campaign contributions, it is 
campaign contributions that has the largest negative impact on the public’s 
perception of the court’s legitimacy.140 It is when judges are perceived as self-
interested in their pursuit of contributions that the public finds it most 
objectionable and has the biggest negative impact on the public’s perception of 
the court.141  
While the survey only examines direct contributions, it is easy to surmise 
the general public would apply the same thought process to contributions that 
fund electioneering communications even if the contributions do not go directly 
to a judicial campaign. The damaging effect money has on the judiciary is 
evidenced by the fact that individuals in states that elect judges have a lower 
approval rating of the judiciary than states with other methods of judicial 
selection.142 Individuals in states with partisan judicial elections, the type of 
                                                     
138 Supra, see note 32 at p. 4 
139 Shira Goodman, “The Danger Inherent the Public Perception that Justice is for Sale” 810 
140 James Gibson, Electing Judges: The Surprising Effects of Campaigning on Judicial 
Legitimacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012),  68-69 
141James Gibson, “Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts” 69 
142 Shira Goodman, “The Danger Inherent the Public Perception that Justice is for Sale” 808 
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judicial selection where the most money is spent, are the most inclined to have an 
unfavorable view of courts and agree judges are just politicians in robes.143 
As the judiciary’s role is different from that of the legislative and executive 
branches and that its unique role requires an additional emphasis on neutrality 
on independence, as well as, the injection of money can have a significantly 
negative impact on the public’s perception of the judiciary even in the absence of 
proof of corruption, it can be reasonable argued that a different standard should 
be applied to the regulation of campaign finance laws in state judicial elections. 
Thus, it being established it would be reasonable to establish a separate legal 
standard to the campaign finance regulations of judicial elections, it is now 
prudent to examine the best method for addressing the presence of dark money 
in state judicial elections.  
Proposed Reform 
To solve the aforementioned issues and strengthen the judiciaries of the states, it 
is argued that the following regulation should be pursued and adopted by the 
states that conduct judicial elections:  
 501 (c)(4)s must create a separate account for any electioneering 
communications or direct advocacy that they intend to spend on state 
judicial elections or on issues that are directly relevant to judicial races 
near the associated spending efforts. If they do indeed make any such 
independent expenditure, the 501(c)(4) must disclose all contributors 
of that separated fund.  
                                                     
143 Matthew Streb, “Judicial Elections and The Public Perception of the Courts,” 158-161 
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o This disclosure requirement is triggered either by an direct 
advocacy or electioneering communication expenditure made by 
the 501(c)(4) or by transferring funds to a 501 or 527 group that has 
coordinated or made any contributions/expenditures to the 
relevant race. This is reset every election cycle.   
 The establishment of a separate fund is also applicable to independent 
expenditure only groups that intend to engage in any electioneering 
communications or direct advocacy. If at any point, the group transfers 
money to another 527 group they must disclose the name of separated 
fund’s contributors. This is to prevent the obfuscation of donors through 
shuffling contributions through multiple organizations.  
o In terms of administrative costs, the two funds don’t need to be 
separated if the disclosure requirements are activated only because 
they transferred funds to an applicable organization. However, if 
the originating agency makes an independent expenditure, then 
administrative costs must be separated. This is done to reduce the 
burden on these groups as there may not be a substantial expense 
associated with funding disbursements, but the potential activities 
associated with independent expenditures – see oppo. research, ad 
buys, production and disbursement of literature – could all amount 
to a very substantial sum.   
It could be argued by those who oppose campaign finance regulations that 
this proposal is not necessary. It would be noted that there is no quantitative 
evidence that judicial corruption is a widespread problem and that any regulation 
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addressing it would create additional restrictions on the democratic process while 
offering no guaranteed resolution to a problem. However, with dark money the 
extent of the problem cannot be identified until light is shed upon judicial 
contributions. Additionally, others may oppose the proposal because it does not 
go far enough. There is a substantial group that opposes any form of judicial 
elections and who would argue that any additional regulation would only further 
legitimize the institution and reduce pressure that exists for a much larger 
overhaul. However, it should be noted that judicial elections are already deeply 
entrenched in state institutions and receive widespread popularity making the 
cessation of judicial elections anywhere highly unlikely.  
As any proposed regulation to address dark money in state judicial 
elections concerns the potential to restrict the free exercise of the first 
amendment. As such, the regulation must be able to survive the strict scrutiny 
test during judicial review, which is that the proposed regulation addresses an 
area of compelling government interest and ameliorates the issue in a matter that 
is not arbitrary of capricious.  
First, it should be noted that the absence of evidence is not the evidence of 
absence. This is especially relevant as one of the intended outcomes of the 
proposed regulation would be to ameliorate the issue of insufficient data that is 
hindering a proper analysis of the extent and influence of money in state judicial 
elections. Should large donors actually achieve undue influence through 
contributions to state judicial elections, these donors would have a vested interest 
in the perpetuation of this framework, and by extension, the obfuscation of any 
data shedding light onto the nature of said influence. Any argument opposed to 
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the proposed regulation solely on the basis of there being insufficient data to 
justify it, when the intent of the regulation is the disclosure of relevant data, is 
reliant upon the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam. As former Supreme 
Court Justice Brandeis wrote, “sunshine is the best disinfectant” and so even in 
the event the proposed regulation reveals an actual absence of evidence and fails 
to deter any future impropriety, in this worst case scenario, the public’s faith in 
the efficacy of their state’s judiciary would likely be positively impacted; a 
critically beneficial outcome at a time of decreasing public faith the judicial 
branch.  
Without quantitative proof of systemic undue influence by, or in favor of, 
large donors by elected judges, the threshold set in Citizens United for the 
upholding of additional restrictions on campaign finance – which seems to have 
been set at readily verifiable quid pro quo-style corruption – remains unsatisfied. 
However, the argument that there is an insufficient basis to implement additional 
regulations on the exercise of speech in this instance is unfounded as the 
applicability of the threshold referenced in Citizens United is not directly 
transferable to the relevant proposed regulation. As the Supreme Court has 
affirmed, case precedent surrounding legislative and executive elections is not 
relevant due to the different nature of judicial elections when compared to 
legislative or executive elections.144 Therefore the quid pro quo threshold of 
Citizens United need not be satisfied.  
                                                     
144
 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, p. 11, see “our precedents applying the First Amendment to 
political elections have little bearing on the issues here.” And Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, p. 1, 
see “States may regulate judicial elections differently than they regulate political elections, 
because the role of judges differs from the role of politicians.” 
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However, my proposal must still satisfy strict scrutiny, meaning that 
because it may negatively impact an individual’s ability to exercise his or her First 
Amendment rights the proposed regulation must have a compelling government 
interest and the remedy be narrowly tailored. As explored, a judge’s role is 
different from that of the legislative and executive branches.145 Arising from this 
institutional difference is the need to preserve the public’s faith in the integrity of 
the judiciary. The Court has recognized safeguarding the public’s confidence in 
the integrity of the nation’s elected judges as a “vital state interest,” and public 
perception of judicial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order.”146  
To clarify, the applicability of all the factors in the Williams-Yulee matter 
do not directly translate to my proposal. One of the central premises in the 
Court’s decision is that Yulee directly solicited contributions while running for 
judicial office, which raised the appearance of impartiality and is what causes the 
public to question her impartiality.147 This particular trigger of impropriety is not 
present in my proposal. Instead, my proposal relies on the Court’s findings in 
Caperton that a litigant may have his or her due process violated if a 
contributor’s role in funding a campaign is significant enough so as to invite 
doubt that the average judge would be able to adjudicate objectively.148 The Court 
                                                     
145 Id. p. 2, see “A State’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary 
extends beyond its interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and executive 
elections, because a judge’s role differs from that of a politician.” 
146 Id. p. 9, see “We have recognized the ‘vital state interest’ in safeguarding ‘public confidence in 
the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.’” And p. 2, see “Public perception of 
judicial integrity is accordingly ‘a state interest of the highest order.’” 
147 Id. p. 5, see “In the court’s view, ‘personal solicitation of campaign funds, even by mass 
mailing, raises an appearance of impropriety and calls into question, in the public’s mind, the 
judge’s impartiality.’” 
148 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., p. 15, see “Due process requires an objective inquiry into 
whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the circumstances “would offer a 
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specifically referenced contributions that were made to 527 groups and 
independent expenditures when totaling the monetary assistance Blankenship, 
the Massey CEO, spent to help elect his preferred judge.149 Taken into 
consideration with dark money, this means that an individual may pour large 
sums of money into an election without ever having to disclose these efforts to 
the general public, and so litigants before the court may have their due process 
violated without ever even knowing about it. This is certainly a prospect that 
could negatively impact the reputation of the judiciary.   
Additionally, the proposed measure would also survive strict scrutiny 
because of its limited nature thereby satisfying that it is nor arbitrary and 
capricious in scope. This regulation only targets additional disclosure which has 
been routinely upheld by the court even as the Court has felled huge swaths of 
other campaign finance regulations. Another benefit of this approach is that 
disclosure is only triggered if these groups take measures to move into judicial 
elections where there is a heightened possibility for a conflict of interest, or 
appearance thereof. So it’s not a standing burden on free speech, it is only 
activated when these groups move into a realm where the government has a 
compelling interest to more intently regulate which should satisfy the compelling 
public interest and narrowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny.  
                                                                                                                                                              
possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and 
true.” 
149
 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., p. 2, see “In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory 
maximum to Benjamin’s campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to “And 
For The Sake Of The Kids,” a political organization formed under 26 U. S. C. §527. The §527 
organization opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin. Blankenship’s donations accounted for 
more than two-thirds of the total funds it raised. Id., at 150a. This was not all. Blankenship spent, 
in addition, just over $500,000 on independent expenditures—for direct mailings and letters 




It is understood that this paper has not conclusively proven the corrupting 
influence of money in the judiciary nor that money is causing adjudication in a 
manner that is discordant with a judge’s constituency. As discussed at the 
inception of this paper, it was that very inability to obtain comprehensive data to 
study these questions that fostered this inquiry. Further, as the proof of an 
improperly motivated adjudication often only exists in the mind of the presiding 
judge, conclusive proof of the negative influence of campaign contributions on 
judicial behavior can be extremely difficult to obtain, a conclusion acknowledged 
by the Supreme Court as well.150   
In recognition of this lack of conclusive proof, it is noted that the Supreme 
Court does not mandate actual proof of corruption to find a litigant has been 
deprived of his or her due process.151 Additionally, the Supreme Court does not 
mandate actual proof of corruption to justify further regulation of judicial 
elections, instead requiring only that the regulation narrowly targets an issue that 
has a negative impact on the public’s perception of the judiciary’s credibility.152 
Even absent definitive proof, sufficient evidence when viewed against the 
potential fallout from falling to act, or acting unnecessarily, can warrant an 
appropriately measured response. My proposed reform is reflective of this lack of 
a definitive conclusion. It is not a sweeping overhaul but merely a call for greater 
disclosure in very specific circumstances. In fact, it is the aim of this reform to 
                                                     
150 Id. p. 15, see “Much like determining whether a judge is actually biased, proving what 
ultimately drives the electorate to choose a particular candidate is a difficult endeavor, not likely 
to lend itself to a certain conclusion.” 
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 Supra, see note 148 
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help provide the public and policymakers with the tools to help obtain definitive 





















In the matter of Varnum v. Brien, the state supreme court justices in Iowa 
performed what they belied to be the duty of the judiciary and ensured the 
equality of a minority group even though the court’s ruling stood in contrast to 
their constituents’ opinion. 153 By ruling in favor of equality for the gay 
community, the Iowa Supreme Court opened itself up to a national firestorm and 
every Iowa Supreme Court justice that was up for a retention election the next 
year was voted out of office by the electorate. Several years later, in a decision 
vindicating the Iowa Supreme Court justices, the United States Supreme Court, 
notably not subject to judicial elections, made a similar ruling thereby legalizing 
marriage for gay couples throughout the U.S.154  
These two outcomes wonderfully represent the divergence of the role of 
courts when elections are introduced. The controversy surrounding the merits of 
judicial elections has been long standing and written about at length in academia. 
However, in the last decade there has been an explosion of money in state judicial 
elections and in the last five years dark money has also increased in prominence 
in state judicial elections.  
The landscape has shifted but the arguments have not. While the 
controversy surrounding judicial elections remains the ability to verify the 
integrity of judicial elections is now absent. Dark money prevents the citizenry 
from measuring what impact campaign contributions are having on judicial 
                                                     
153 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) 




adjudication. If proponents of judicial elections wish to continue to cite the 
majoritarian benefit when advocating for state judicial elections, they must also 
be able to offer the ability to verify that extra-constituent donors have not 
nullified that benefit and have incentivized elected judges from ruling in a 
manner that is not reflective of their constituents. That is why proponents and 
opponents of judicial elections should both equally support additional campaign 
finance disclosure regulations regarding contributions that can benefit a judicial 
candidate. The policy proposal contained here within does not resolve all of the 
issues, but it does strive to provide policy makers with the information to make 
informed decisions and to determine whether the main justification for the 
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